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Abstract 
Some long-term marketing contracts in the North American hog sector provide for 
price-dependent loan agreements at low rates. We show that these provisions linking 
pricing with financing are hybrids between forward rate agreements and commodity 
options. This observation presents approaches for valuing the stipulations. We suggest 
that the ledger arrangement is transaction-cost efficient, especially for a packer with a 
natural partial pass-through hedge from retail market positions. 
 
Keywords: commodity option, contract production, forward rate agreement. 
 
JEL classification: Q1, L2, G3 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
LEDGER PROVISION IN HOG MARKETING CONTRACTS 
Tighter integration in the hog production sector in North America has given rise 
to unfamiliar risk sharing and financing arrangements. In some cases, marketing 
contracts of up to ten years duration specify that a downstream integrator, often a 
packing company, must share downside and upside market hog and feed price risk 
with the grower. In other cases, the integrator and grower agree to maintain a ledger 
account, whereby they lend to each other at specified rates. The extent of the transfers 
depends on how market hog and feed prices evolve over the duration of the contract.  
These various provisions are not readily valued, and this has been a significant 
problem for the industry (Buhr 2000; Lawrence and Vontalge 2000; Martin 1998). 
Growers want to know if the proposals do reduce risk and if the terms are, in 
expectations, not unduly unfavorable. Integrators have the same concerns, but from 
their own perspective. Third-party lenders want to know the true nature of assets and 
liabilities of the entity they are financing. Even though third-party lenders generally 
prefer that hog producers enter into long-term contracts (Godley 1996), off-balance 
sheet and obscure liabilities always concern financiers. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that price movements have caused financial 
problems for many participants in the North American hog sector. Indeed, even the 
most experienced livestock integrators have made miscalculations in contract design. 
In August 2002, Arkansas-based poultry and hog packer Tyson declared its intention 
to exit many stages of hog production because of liabilities arising from persistently 
low hog prices (Smith 2002a). Concerns have been raised that other pork packers may 
not be able to finance their way through price and lending assurances given to 
growers (Smith 2002b).  
Quite apart from the implications for efficient planning, if and when contractual 
relations terminate early (as with Tyson), the valuation of assets and obligations will 
be an issue in settlement. Valuation may also be important when designing and 
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implementing public policy. The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 attests 
that promoting price transparency in agricultural markets is U.S. federal policy. Yet 
the loan terms of some ledger contracts cloud the true price to be paid. In addition, 
some policy setters offer ledger-style interventions to growers. Continuing an 
intervention mechanism used in 1998–99, the provincial government in 
Saskatchewan, Canada, made price-contingent loans available to hog growers in 
2003–04. The rate (prime) was lower than commercial rates available to small 
businesses.  
The issue addressed in this paper is the valuation of these contractually provided 
price-contingent loans. We show that these provisions are hybrids between forward 
(interest) rate agreements and commodity spot options. This allows an approximate, 
valuation using standard option pricing and interest rate arbitrage arguments. Our 
work here extends the observations in Gardner 1977, in Unterschultz et al. 1998, and 
in Shao and Roe 2003 (forthcoming). Gardner pointed out that price-contingent 
government support payments for agricultural commodities could be valued as put 
options. Unterschultz et al. decomposed a popular feature of a hog marketing 
contract, the market hog price window, into a combination of a put and a call at the 
same maturity but at different strike prices. Shao and Roe, focusing on price 
averaging provisions in marketing contracts, modeled the conditions as Asian-Basket 
options. None of these papers looked at the main theme of this article, the valuation 
of lending provisions in marketing contracts. 
 
Valuing the Ledger Provision 
We studied some relevant provisions of two ledger-style contracts offered by 
John Morrell and Company and posted on the Iowa Attorney General’s web site 
(Iowa Attorney General 2003). In each, the true hog price paid is supplemented with a 
loan from the integrator to the grower when prices are below a reference price. The 
loan is paid off when prices are higher, and then a reserve balance also may be built 
up in anticipation of lower future spot prices. 
Contract #1 settles the balance regardless of the sign of the ledger balance at 
contract termination, and we model this first. Contract #2 settles the balance only 
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when the grower owes Morrell. This provision is modeled at the conclusion of the 
section. In each contract, the interest rate is zero, but this is not the case in other 
ledger contracts. The relevant parts of the contracts are provided in the appendix.1  
Two-Way Settlement 
Let 0t   denote the current time, with S
 
 as the time t    spot price. A ledger 
contract expires at time t T . Let T N   such that deliveries take place at t n  , 
n  {1,2, ... , }N . The risk-sharing price floor F in the ledger contract generates the 
payoff for the producer as follows: S
 
  if S F
 
  and ( ),0 1F S F  
 
     , 
otherwise at time t   . However, the producer is required to pay back the difference, 
( ) (1 )( )F S F S F S 
     
      , at t T  with an instantaneous interest rate )(tr  
set by the integrator that is predetermined, finite, and continuously compounded.2 Rate 
( )r t  is typically set at a number between zero and the prime rate. 
Let ( )r t  denote the finite, instantaneous market interest (and discount) rate to the 
grower at time t when quoted at the current time period. The time t    discounted 
value of (1 )( )F S
 
   paid at t T  is exp{ [ ( ) ( )] }(1 )( )T r t r t dt F S
 
 
   . Thus, 
the actual present discounted payoff (at t   ) to the grower is 
 
*
if ,
( ) exp{ [ ( ) ( )] }(1 )( ), otherwise.Tf
S S F
F S F r t r t dt F S

 
   
   
 
	
 
     
 
 (1) 
The gain from a price floor is * ( , )(1 ) max( ,0)f S Z T F S         , with 
( , )Z T   1 exp{ [ ( ) ( )] }T r t r t dt
 
  . The latter represents the payoff from ( , )Z T  
put options with strike price F and maturity date t   . The value of the price floor 
at 0t   is ( , )(1 ) ( , )Z T p F   , where ( , )p F   is the premium for a put option 
with strike price F and maturity date t   . Similar considerations apply to all the 
future periods. 
As a result, the total value of the price floor to the grower is 
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1
( 0) ( , )(1 ) ( , ).Nf nV t Z n T p F n       (2) 
Notice that if ( ) ( ) [ , ]r t r t t T     then ( 0) 0fV t    because the interest rate 
differential neither subsidizes nor penalizes the grower. As ( ) ( )r t r t  in most 
contracts, we then have 0fV   to the grower. The agreement to provide loans in the 
future (a forward rate agreement) at rate ( )r t , rather than ( )r t , is to the grower’s 
advantage because the state-contingent loans previously modeled can be awarded 
only to the grower.3 
On the other hand, a risk-sharing price ceiling provides the following payoff to 
the producer: S
 
  if S K
 
  and ( ),0 1K S K  
 
     , otherwise at time 
t   . Once again, the difference, positive or negative, returns to the producer at 
t T . The actual payoff is 
 
*
if ,
( ) exp{ [ ( ) ( )] }(1 )( ), otherwise.Tc
S S K
K S K r t r t dt S K

 
   
   
 
	
 
     
 
 (3) 
Calculating the difference, the loss to the grower from a price ceiling amounts to 
*
c S     ( , )(1 )max( ,0)Z T S K      . 
The latter represents the payoff from ( , )(1 )Z T    written call options with 
strike price K and maturity date t   . The value of the price ceiling at 0t   is 
( , )(1 ) ( , )Z T c K    , where ( , )c K   is the premium for a call option with strike 
price K and maturity date t   . Similar considerations apply to all the future periods. 
The total value of the price ceiling to the grower is 
 
1
( 0) ( , )(1 ) ( , ).Nc nV t Z n T c K n        (4) 
Finally, the value of a ledger contract is l f cV V V  ; that is, 
  1( 0) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) .
N
l n
V t Z n T p F n c K n 
 
         (5) 
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If the provision, when considered by itself, is fair, then ( 0) 0lV t   . If 
( ) ( )r t r t t    [ , ]T , then ( , ) 0 {1,2, ... , }Z n T n N    . In that case, condition 
(1 ) ( , )p F n    (1 ) ( , ) {1,2, ... , }c K n n N     ensures that the ledger provision 
has positive financial value to the grower at 0t  . This inequality on put and call 
value relations holds whenever the integrator assumes most of the downside risk (i.e., 
  is close to zero or F  is high), or the grower reverts only a small fraction of upside 
price movements (i.e.,   is close to unity or K  is high). Contract terms are then 
more generous than price parameters alone would suggest. After 0t  , the provision 
likely will assume positive or negative value as spot prices decrease or increase. 
We have yet to place values on the options. Subject to acknowledging the true 
nature of the options, standard procedures may be applied. The options are on spot 
prices and it is important to model future commodity spot prices carefully, especially 
with distant maturities. Equilibrium adjustments suggest that mean reversion, rather 
than standard geometric Brownian motion, is appropriate as a characterization of 
price stochastics. Hilliard and Reis (1998), and also Miltersen and Schwartz (1998), 
provide valuation procedures that accommodate commodity price mean reversion. 
A more problematic issue is that readily traded price contract markets of any kind 
are thin beyond three years forward. The integrator may have difficulty in setting off 
assumed risks because of low liquidity in spot and near-term forward markets. 
Grimes and Plain (2003) report that sales in hog spot markets have fallen to account 
for less than 14 percent of total market hogs in early 2003. In this light, the 
assumption of risk-free arbitrage with spot markets is quite tenuous, although 
imperfect substitutes (processed meats) may be available. Valuation will depend upon 
the asset positions and risk preferences of the contract holder. The latter is not readily 
elicited. Work by Hall and Murphy (2002), for example, suggests ways of accounting 
for valuation when it is costly or impossible to eliminate risk. 
A further issue we have not considered is default risk. The literature on 
measuring and mitigating exposure is large (see Duffie and Singleton 2003 on 
methodologies). Some integrators require that a reserve be built up as a ledger 
balance due the grower when prices are high; see Contract #1 in the appendix. This 
provision, which we have not modeled, performs like a futures market margin 
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account in reducing integrator credit risk exposure. Including feed prices as a factor in 
determining loans also should help in reducing the risk of grower default, but may 
increase the risk of integrator default. 
One-Way Settlement 
We now turn to the contract provision whereby the integrator receives any 
balance owed in the ledger account but does not pay any balance owing at 
termination. In this case, the value of the ledger contract to the grower is equal to  
  1( 0) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) .
N
l a n
V t V Z n T p F n c K n 
 
          (6) 
where aV  is the value of a compound Asian option that provides the following payoff 
at t T : a  1max{ [(1 ) max( ,0) (1 ) max( ,0)],0}
N
n nn
F S S K 
    
      . This 
equation is arrived at by first assuming that the two-way ledger account provision 
applies. After repaying any outstanding loans, the grower may also have to repay an 
amount at contract termination. If and only if the undiscounted accumulation of loans 
received in low-price spot markets, (1 ) max( ,0)nF S    , exceeds the undiscounted 
accumulation of loan reversions in high-price spot markets, (1 ) max( ,0)nS K    , 
then the difference is due to the integrator at maturity. Standard procedures to value 
Asian options involve Monte Carlo simulation because closed-form solutions are 
generally not possible. Procedures are outlined in Hull 2002 and in McDonald 2003. 
 
Discussion 
We have provided a means of valuing an important provision in hog marketing 
contracts. We did not address why integrators finance growers, and a motive is not 
immediate. The market problem likely concerns liquidity, although tax and other 
motives may have secondary significance. Integrators may have access to capital 
markets at more favorable rates because of the comparative size of their financial 
operations. This, according to Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990), is one 
prerequisite for the efficiency of longer-term contracts over less-committed 
relationships. Still, if a bank has an existing relationship with the grower and is 
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prepared to provide risky longer-term loans for the infrastructure underpinning a 
production operation, then why not use shorter-term loans that stabilize the operation? 
When hog prices are low, integrators may be able to procure hogs elsewhere at better 
terms than those in the contract, and so a grower’s default is not necessarily bad in 
this regard. 
Where the goals of the integrator and the bank do align is the procurement of a 
steady flow of uniform and high-quality hogs. Key and McBride (2003) provide 
evidence to suggest that contract production is more efficient (as measured by volume 
of output relative to input use), although whether the grower retains more of the 
surplus to service loans is another issue. The move toward value-added pork 
production, with emphasis on food safety, has generated a need for stronger vertical 
links, and, again, the banker may wish to avoid a grower who is closed out of a 
premium that is paid for downstream confidence in product quality.4 
While it generally provides higher prices, marketing through a committed 
relationship leaves the grower vulnerable. The grower must make two sorts of 
investments. Resources, typically with a significant fraction borrowed, are invested in 
site-specific infrastructure with imperfectly substitutable alternative uses. In addition, 
the grower must make human capital investments in producing the categories of hogs, 
and often under the desired procedures, the integrator wants. The investments are 
vulnerable to hold-up if alternative outlets for market hogs are imperfect substitutes. 
Default on a contract due to liquidity problems would leave the grower vulnerable to 
renegotiations. Growers, in foreseeing renegotiations, may seek either a bank credit 
line guarantee or a contract design with measures to avoid a liquidity crunch. 
Quite apart from entry, liquidity concerns also affect incentives for the grower. 
This may be particularly true of noncontractible grower investments in producing 
quality hogs in which direct means of control are not possible. Theories on the role of 
debt and liquidity on incentives exist, as in Aghion and Bolton 1992 and also in Hart 
1995 and 2001, but we cannot find any that explains why the contractor should in 
effect provide the credit line. Sunk cost investments in buildings and human capital 
should be made to work until obsolescence, yet a cash-poor company may have to 
idle its assets, and this may not (it should not) be in the interests of any party. The 
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integrator will know the industry better and may know the grower better than would a 
third-party lender. 
Most likely it is more transaction-cost efficient for the integrator to provide 
liquidity for growers rather than for a bank to open a line of credit. The integrator, 
too, may be well-placed to hedge price risk (especially near-term) as a part of daily 
operations. When a packer contracts, then, to the extent that retail-level and farm-
level prices covary, there may be little need to hedge. However, packers would be 
wise to apprise when correlations fail and to regularly re-estimate the consequences 
of a failure. The effect of liquidity on incentives needs scrutiny too. Removing the 
risk of near-term default and/or renegotiation may strengthen incentives to make 
value-enhancing investments. But ledger contracts may just postpone a business 
failure. In addition, the integrator may face the soft-budget constraint syndrome, as 
discussed in Maskin and Xu 2001, and ultimately may roll over or forgive some debts 
of a valued grower at contract maturity. 
  
Endnotes 
1. We do not model all of the many features in the ledger provisions of these 
contracts. 
2. By this we mean that $1 compounds to 
0
exp{ ( ) }T r t dt  over the interval [0, ]T . 
3. On forward rate agreements, see Hull 2002 or McDonald 2003. 
4. See Dickinson and Bailey 2002 on a consumer premium for traceability in pork 
and beef red meats. Kilmer, Andre, and Stevens (2001) provide related 
information in the fruit and vegetables sector. 
  
 
Appendix 
Extract from Morrell Contract #1 
“Whenever the market price of live hogs is less than or equal to the floor price, 
Morrell will pay the producer based on the $40.00/cwt floor price, and will reduce the 
balance of the producer’s ledger account by the difference, if any, between the market 
price and the floor price per hundred weight of delivered hogs. Conversely, whenever 
the market price of live hogs is greater than the floor price, Morrell will first apply 
100% of the difference between the market price and the floor price per hundred 
weight of delivered hogs to reduce or eliminate a negative balance, if any, in the 
producer’s ledger account. If the ledger account does not have a negative balance (or 
as soon as the negative balance has been reduced to zero), Morrell will pay the 
balance of the market price to the producer, except that, whenever the balance of the 
market price payable to the producer (after reducing any negative balance in the 
producer’s ledger account to zero) exceeds $43.00/cwt, Morrell will first apply 20% 
of the difference between the market price and $43.00/cwt to build up a reserve (i.e., 
a positive balance) in the producer’s ledger account. The positive balance in the 
producer’s ledger account will never be allowed to exceed an amount equal to $5.00 
times the number of market hogs the producer has projected to produce over the 
contract period.” 
“At the end of the contract period, if the producer’s ledger account shows a 
positive balance, then Morrell will pay this amount to the producer in cash, without 
interest, within 30 days; or, if the producer’s ledger account shows a negative 
balance, then the producer will pay this amount to Morrell in cash, without interest, 
within 30 days.” 
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Extract from Morrell Contract #2 
This contract was represented as FOR DISCUSSION ONLY: SAMPLE 
FORMAT. 
“At the beginning of the contract period, the producer’s ledger account may have 
a balance of zero but at any time during the contract period, the account may only 
reflect a balance due Morrell or zero. It will not reflect a balance due the producer 
from Morrell.” 
“At the end of the contract period, if the producer’s ledger account shows a 
negative balance, then the producer will pay this amount to Morrell in cash, without 
interest, within 30 days.”
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